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MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
clear chance comes into being, if the evidence so warrants, as it
does in this case.18
The trial court in the Martin case entered judgment for the plaintiff.
The case concerned an automobile-train collision, where the automobile
(proceeding parallel to the tracks) attempted a turn onto the tracks.
Ostensibly, the court characterized the negligence of the train's engineer,
in failing to utilize the opportunity to stop upon notice of the automobile,
as the sole proximate cause of the injury. The holding seems well reasoned.
The court in the instant case, however, relying on eminent text authorities14
as a basis for overruling the Martin case, stated that last clear chance
instructions in such instances are without reason or justification. The
reasoning by which the court reaches this conclusion is not apparent from
a reading of the case.
Viewed from a policy standpoint, the court is using the comparative
negligence statute as a shield for the railroad. Interestingly enough, the
same statute has been criticised as being too harsh to the railroad. 15
Perhaps the instant case is indicative of judicial modification of anti-railroad
legislation. From the legal aspect, the doctrine of last clear chance in
comparative negligence cases must be considered to determine whether
or not the defendant's negligence is the sole proximate cause of the
accident. If it is, there is no need to apply the comparative negligence
statute, and even in situations where the negligence of both plaintiff and
defendant concurred to produce the injury, the doctrine of last clear chance,
used in a relative sense, is still needed to determine the degree of defendant's
negligence, thus enabling an apportionment of damages according to the
comparative negligence statute.'6
SnLv N. HOLTZMAN
REAL PROPERTY-BUILDING RESTRICTIONS-
PROPERTY RIGHTS
In a suit by an incorporated town to enjoin the Board of Public
Instruction from erecting or operating a public school, the question arose
as to whether or not private building restrictions constitute "property" in
the sense that compensation must be paid to their owners as part of eminent
domain proceedings. Held, that such restrictions are not compensible.
13. Id. at 512.
14. James, Last Clear Chance-A Transitional Doctrine, 47 YALE L.J. 704 (1938);
Maclntyre, The Rationale of Last Clear Chance, 53 HARv. L. REv. 1225 (1940);
Pound, Comparative Negligence, 13 NACCA L. J. 195 (1951); Recent Statute, 52
HARv. L. REV. 1187 (1938). Using text authorities as the basis for a decision is
considered by many to be unusual.
15. Loftin v. Crowley, 150 Fla. 836, 8 So.2d 909 (1942) (where the court
refused to declare the statute unconstitutional merely because motor carriers were
not made liable under similar circumstances).
16. In Martin v. Sussman, 82 So.2d 597 (Fla. 1955), the court, in citing the case
under note, stated that the doctrine of last clear chance is no longer applicable in suits
against a railroad company, without qualifying the doctrine and its relation to proximate
cause.
CASENOTES
Board of Public Instruction v. Town of Bay Harbor Islands, 81 So.2d 637
(Fla. 1955).
The authorities are divided over whether compensation must be paid
to the dominant tenement owners of an equitable servitude for the
extinguishment of their rights by governmental condemnation.' Several
courts have denied compensation stating simply that the restrictions were
not being violated. They classify such rights as being applicable only to
private matters.2 Others have taken the view that the extinguishment of
an equitable servitude is not a taking of private property for which com-
pensation must be paid.3 This view received much support in the oft-cited
case of United States v. Certain Lands in Jmnestown,4 wherein it was
decided that no property right whatever springs from a private covenant
that the land of another shall not be used for governmental purposes:
Acts done in proper exercise of governmental powers, and not
directly encroaching upon private property, though their conse-
quences may impair its use, are universally held not to be a 'taking,'
within the meaning of the constitutional provision for compensa-
tion."
Another line of authority which disallows compensation is represented
by those courts which refer to covenants which limit the use of property
as "mere" contractual rights." These courts hold that equitable servitudes
must be strictly construed and not extended by implication.7  A typical
statement is:
. .. but the restrictions are not truly property rights, but
contractual rights, which the government in the exercise of its
sovereign power may take without payment of compensation.8
However, by the weight of authority, these servitudes are recognized
as being similar to legal easements,9 Judge Pound, for example, having said,
"These restrictive covenants create a property right . '. .",0 Easements
1. 2 AMEMRCAN LAw OF PROPERTY § 9.40 (Casner ed. 1952).
2. Moses v. Hazen, 69 F.2d 842 (D.C. Cir. 1934); United States v. Certain
Lands in Jamestown, 112 Fed. 622 (C.C.R.I. 1899), aff'd, Wharton v. United States,
153 Fed. 876 (1 Cir. 1902); Friesen v. City of Glendale, 209 Cal. 524, 288 Pac. 1080
(1930); Kessler v. Lower Merion Dist., 346 Pa. 305, 30 A.2d 117 (1934).
3 Anderson v. Lynch, 188 Ga. 154, 3 S.E.2d 85 (1939); Doan v. Cleveland
Short Line Ry., 92 Ohio St. 461, 112 N.E. 505 (1915); Houston v, Wynne, 279
S.W. 916 (Tex. App. 1926).
4. 112 Fed. 622 (1899); See Aigler, Measure of Compensation for Extinguishment
of Easement by Condemnation 1945 Wis. L. REV. 5, 22, wherein it is stated that
this portion of the case so heavily relied upon is dictum.
5. Id. at 623 (On motion to dismiss).
6. Anderson v. Lynch, 188 Ga. 154, 3 S.E.2d 85 (1939); Sackett v. Los Angeles
City School Dist., 118 Cal- 254, 5 P.2d 23 (1931).
7. Wilton v. Saxon, 6 Ves. 106 (1801)(not to break up mowing land); Martin
v. Nutkin, 2 P. Wms. 266 (1724)(promise not to ring a bell); Cf. Whatman v.
Gibson, 9 Simons 196 (1838).
8. City of Raleigh v. Edwards, 235 N.C. 671, 71 S.E.Zd (1952).
9. Town of Stamford v. Vuono, 108 Conn. 359, 143 Atl. 245 (1928); Ladd v.
Boston, 151 Mass. 585, 24 N.E. 858 (1890); Johnstone v. Detroit, G-I. & M. R.R.,
245 Mich. 65, 222 N.W. 325 (1928); Peters v. Buckner, 288 Mo. 618, 232 S.W.
1024 (1921); Hayes v. WVaverly & P.R. Co. 51 N.J. Eq. 345, 27 Aft. 648 (1893);
Flynn v. New York R.R., 218 N.Y. 140, 112 N.E. 913 (1916).
10. Flynn v. New York R.R., 218 N.Y. 140, 112 N.E. 913 (1916).
MIAMI LAW OQUARTERLY
and similar rights in land, provided they are rights enforceable by the courts
as against the owners of the land, constitute property in the constitutional
sense. 1' Equity will enjoin the breach of a negative covenant on the
ground that an interest in land is involved.12 The majority takes its stand
upon the proposition that a negative easement is a vested interest in
land.'3  Therefore, pursuant to this view, the owner of land for whose
benefit the restriction is imposed is entitled to compensation."
In the instant case, after an exhaustive survey of the law, the court
concluded that equitable servitudes ". . . are more properly classified as
rights arising out of contract," and that ". . . it (the paying of compensation
for the servitudes] would place upon the public an intolerable burden
wholly out of proportion to any conceivable benefits to those who might
be entitled to compensation."' 5  The court admits that though public
policy reasons are not entirely controlling, ", . . they would be compelling
and forceful factors in the determination in which way the scales of reason
and justice incline." Justice Drew concludes that what seems to be the
minority view may, in fact, be the majority, relying upon a 1939 Georgia
Supreme Court decision which held that equitable servitudes do not vest
in their owners a property right for which compensation must be paid.'8
In this writer's opinion, building restrictions, such as those encountered
in the instant case, are, in fact, private property, and are interests in real
estate running with the land and, consequently, property rights of value.
The right to control the land of another is of itself a property right of
the holder. Therefore, the rule that, ". . .private property may not be
taken for public purposes without just compensation . . ", r applies here
and seems to be the better rule and the one most often followed.' 8  A
taking without compensation negates all principles of ownership and
rights attached thereto. LEONARD SELKOWrrz
1i. Chicago & N.W. Ry. v. Garrett, 239 II1. 297, 87 N.E. 1009 (1909); Sherwood
v. LaFayette, 109 Ind. 411, 10 N.E. 89 (1887).
12. Dickerson v. Grand Junction Canal Co., 15 Beav. 261 (1853) (not to dig a
well); Steward v. \Vinters, 4 Sandf. Gh. 682 (1847)(not to use premises except
for dry goods business); Rankin v. Huskisson, 4 Simons 13 (1830)(not to erect a
building). Cf. Ttulk v. Moxhay, 2 Ph. 774, 41 Eng. Rep. 1143 (1848); CLANK,
PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY § 96 (1948).
13. Scott v. Avery, 156 Mich. 674, 121 N.W. 825 (1908); Trustees v, Lynch,
70 N.Y. 440, 26 Am. Rep. 615 (1877); City of Raleigh v. Edwards 235 N.C. 671,
71 S.E.2d 396 (1952).
14. Ladd v. Boston, 151 Mass. 585, 24 N.E. 858 (1890); Allen v. Detroit, 167
Mich. 464, 133 N.W. 317 (1911); Peters v. Buckner, 288 Mo. 618, 232 S.V. 1024
(1921); Flynn v. R.R., 218 N.Y. 140, 112 N.E. 913 (1916); Meagher v. Appalachian
Elec. Power Co., 195 Va. 138, 77 S.E.2d 461 (1953); Long Eaton Recreation Co. v.
Midland Ry., 2 K.B. 574 (1902); Kirby v. School Board, I Ch. 437 (1896);
RESrATEMENT, PRoPERTY § 566 (1944).
15. Board of Public Instruction v. Town of Bay Harbor Islands, 81 So.Zd 637,
643 (Fla. 1955).
16. Anderson v. Lynch, 188 Ga. 154, 3 S E.2d 85, 122 (1939).
17. Campbell v. New Haven, 101 Conn. 173, 125 Atl. 650 (1924).
See also Burger v. St. Paul,-Minn.-, 64 N.W. 2d 73 (1954)(wherein the
cotrt stated that the term "owner" in statutes relating to the exercise of eminent
domain includes any person having a lawful interest in the property to be condemned I
18. See note 1 supra. See cases cited.
